For companies operating in sensitive global sectors, reputation has already become part of the supply chain
Technological competition in the age of artificial intelligence is increasingly defined not only by innovation, but by the speed and scale of information advantage. Companies, who once upon a time competed through offering superior products and services, are now competing on a new playing field, one driven by data, automation and predictive analytics, not product or service superiority.
AI has accelerated this transformation. Research, analysis and market intelligence have become democratized and medium-sized companies now have access to capabilities historically accessible to the few.
Of course, the positive contribution of AI to businesses cannot be ignored. According to IBM, by using an AI-powered unified data platform, companies can save $1.2 million to $3.4 million annually and reduce infrastructure-management costs for data processing by 65% to 85% in a year. In terms of predictive analysis, combining machine learning, consumer behavior, market-generated insights and operational data, AI tools can produce scenarios that help companies act more efficiently.
Yet accessibility, no matter how positive, creates vulnerabilities. Tools that level the playing field can and increasingly are being weaponized by bad actors—not only competitors, but also criminal networks. Operators in reputationally sensitive sectors such as aviation, logistics, finance and critical infrastructure are particularly at risk. When reputation, trust and regulatory confidence are successfully undermined, operational performance and product superiority become irrelevant.
Unfair competition has long been defined by familiar tactics: undercutting prices, poaching clients and contract breaches. Today, the tactics are far more extensive and easily obfuscated. Disinformation-as-a-Service and Dark PR are being supported by bot activity and automation. Targeted reputational attacks are deployable almost instantly at increasing scale and with a level of false credibility that is virtually undetectable.
The resource availability to deploy disinformation campaigns are easily accessible and available to firms seeking to compete effectively, even if they choose to employ underhanded tactics. According to a report published last year, in the United States alone, AI-driven disinformation spread is projected to rise sharply by 2026.
European firms face the same challenge from actors who choose to play dirty and deploy reputational pressure, forged narratives or regulatory manipulation to weaken rivals. Dark PR, Disinformation-as-a-Service and kompromat practices are increasingly being added to the corporate lexicon and for each of these strategies, AI increases their effectiveness and facilitates proliferation.
A victim of the strategic (and nefarious) deployment of AI which has been in the headlines highlighting the risks posed by such campaigns is Aerospace Technical Services Co. Ltd. (ATS). ATS, an aviation parts and logistics company headquartered in both Amman and Dubai, was targeted by a coordinated, multi-year disinformation campaign involving the alleged impersonation of U.S. government officials, false claims of influence with U.S. agencies, interference with logistics providers, fraud, extortion, cross-border financial misconduct and extensive reputational attack.
ATS and its chief executive, Mahdi Al-Tahaineh, were targeted by a network of rogue actors including Mohammad Ali Abdulrahman Al-Daboubi, Omar Mansour Kloub, Tareq Mansour Kloub and James H. “Jim” Johnson III. These individuals and related associates employed claims of U.S. government access and regulatory influence to exert pressure on the company, interfere with delicate aviation supply chains and subsequently, damage its commercial relationships
What makes this case study especially unique is that it showcases how reputational harm can directly translate into operational disruptions. Omar Kloub was falsely introduced as the “CIA Chief of Station in Amman” and as a result of this “position” claimed to be capable of helping ATS understand and navigate the regulatory frameworks overseen by the Department of Justice, Department of Commerce, Department of Homeland Security and U.S. customs. However, through internal verification processes which took place at a later stage, ATS learned that Kloub was an impersonator and had never served in the CIA or any other U.S. government agency.
Furthermore, Kloub and Al-Daboubi reportedly also made use of these representations to place themselves in the midst of highly sensitive regulatory and commercial matters. This included, but was not limited to Russia-related aviation transactions, an aircraft engine deal, customs issues and relationships with freight providers. After ATS refused to pay them millions of dollars to lobby and provide regulatory assistance for problems they themselves created for ATS, amounting to blackmail, matters escalated. Aerospace Technical Services Co. Ltd. (ATS) and its CEO Mahdi Al-Tahaineh were subjected to a negative media campaign, alongside persistent outreach which sought to damage its business relationships. This negative media campaign was based on outright lies and forged documents allegedly created by Ali Al-Daboubi and his associates. There have since been multiple media retractions after ATS’s legal team established that the allegations surrounding ATS were meritless and that ATS has and continues to operate lawfully.
The case study also shows how logistics channels themselves can become instruments of power and pressure. According to the case, Tareq Kloub, was in actuality, a U.S. Postal Service employee who was presented as a senior U.S. customs official, explaining how he gained unauthorized access to shipment data on vendors and logistics providers.
In highly regulated industries, such as the aviation industry, any allegation, no matter how false, can be commercially damaging. This is true even if a formal investigation never ensues. Banks, suppliers and logistics providers are unwilling to engage when they perceive risk surrounding delicate issues such as sanctions or export controls, no matter how far-fetched allegations may be.
This is precisely where the discussion about AI democratization becomes urgent. AI tools can make such claims and campaigns ever more convincing, more personalized and much faster to execute. This is true across the broader ecosystem of bad actors operating across jurisdictions. Al-Daboubi is described as a retired member of the Jordanian Armed Forces and alleged business partner of Rami Ghanem, who was convicted in the United States in connection with black-market arms trafficking of surface-to-air missiles for use by clients in Libya, Iraq, and the leadership of Hezbollah, and is now sitting in US federal prison after being sentenced to 30 years. Omar Kloub is a longtime partner of Al-Daboubi through a company called Gateway to MENA, an organization reportedly connected to money laundering, smuggling and arms-trafficking.
The significance of this case lies in what it reveals about modern competitive risk. For companies in sensitive sectors, protection is no longer required only against cyberattacks, but also against coordinated efforts to distort reputation, influence regulatory perception, and disrupt strategic relationships. A false or misleading allegation need not be legally proven to inflict serious damage; it need only create sufficient doubt for a strategic partner to disengage. The regulatory implications are equally significant. The EU’s Digital Services Act and Digital Markets Act mark important progress in addressing online harms and unfair digital behavior, but cases like ATS reveal a more complex threat. This is not only a question of content moderation or platform accountability. It is about the weaponization of digital tools, forged credibility, impersonation, and strategic disinformation to distort markets, disrupt commercial relationships, and damage legitimate businesses. For companies operating in sensitive global sectors and in today’s market, reputation is no longer just a public-facing asset; it is critical infrastructure.
