Most organisations depend on encryption they rarely think about. It protects customer records, internal communications and financial systems, and for decades the mathematics behind it has been treated as safe. That assumption now has a visible end date, as governments and standards bodies set firm timetables for moving to encryption designed to withstand quantum computers.
In August 2024, the US National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) published its first three finalised post-quantum encryption standards and encouraged system administrators to begin transitioning to them as soon as possible. Enterprise cybersecurity adviser Guerassim Nikolov believes many leadership teams still treat the subject as a distant technical concern, when the pressing question is how much can be done while there is still time.
A risk that arrives before the technology
Quantum computers able to break today’s encryption are still being developed, but NIST notes that some experts predict such a device could appear within a decade.
The more immediate concern is what NIST describes as the “harvest now, decrypt later” threat, in which adversaries collect encrypted data now with the aim of decrypting it once quantum computers are capable of doing so. The European Commission, which refers to the same risk as “store now, decrypt later”, considers such attacks already likely to be occurring. Information that must stay confidential for years may therefore already be exposed, even though it cannot yet be read.
“The data an organisation encrypts this year may still need to be confidential in 2040,” says Guerassim Nikolov. “If it is copied today, it is only as safe as the encryption it will face when someone eventually tries to break it. That places post-quantum readiness on the risk register now.”
The deadlines are already set
The UK’s National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC) has published a three-stage timeline. By 2028, organisations should define their migration goals, carry out a full discovery exercise and build an initial plan. By 2031, they should carry out their early, highest-priority migration activities. By 2035, migration to post-quantum cryptography should be complete across all systems, services and products.
The European Commission states that all EU member states should start transitioning by the end of 2026, with high-risk use cases transitioned as soon as possible and no later than the end of 2030. In the United States, a June 2026 memorandum from the Office of Management and Budget directs federal agencies to mitigate as much quantum risk as feasible by 31 December 2030, followed by a final phase, targeted for 2035, to complete the migration of remaining systems.
These dates can appear generous, yet NIST’s draft report on the transition observes that the journey from algorithm standardisation to full integration into information systems can take 10 to 20 years, and that past cryptographic migrations have taken over a decade. Measured against that history, the period between now and 2035 is short.
Begin with a cryptographic inventory
An organisation cannot replace what it cannot find. Encryption is embedded in applications, network equipment, cloud services and third-party software, often configured years ago. The US memorandum states that “the foundation of the migration plan is a dynamic, continuously updated inventory of all cryptographic assets”.
The NCSC’s discovery stage asks organisations to establish which services and infrastructure depend on cryptography and, for the data involved, to record its expected lifetime and its value to an adversary. Services processing the most valuable or long-lived data should then be prioritised.
In Guerassim Nikolov’s view, this inventory works best when it is treated as part of an organisation’s wider data security and risk assessment rather than as a standalone technical exercise.
“A cryptographic inventory is, in effect, a map of where an organisation’s most sensitive information sits and how it is protected,” he says. “Once leadership can see that map, systems can be ranked by how long their data must remain secret, and investment can follow that ranking instead of an attempt to upgrade everything at once.”
Planning on the organisation’s own terms
Early preparation allows changes to be aligned with hardware refresh cycles and contract renewals, suppliers to be asked about their post-quantum plans during routine procurement, and budgets to be spread across several years rather than concentrated in a late, compressed programme.
“Organisations that start now can set their own pace,” he adds. “Those that wait are likely to find the deadlines setting the pace for them, with less time, fewer options and higher costs.”
A matter for leadership
For business leaders, security leaders and investors, post-quantum readiness is becoming a useful indicator of how well an organisation understands its own exposure. The standards are published, the timelines are set and the NCSC’s first milestone falls in 2028. Organisations that know where their cryptography sits can manage the change deliberately, protecting long-lived data and the trust of customers and partners.